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Limited Liability and the Development of Capital Markets 
 
By Ed Nosal and Michael Smart 
 
We study the consequences of the introduction of widespread limited liability for 
corporations. In the traditional view, limited liability reduces transactions costs and 
enhances investment incentives for individuals and firms. But this view does not explain 
several important stylized facts of the British experience, including the slow rate of 
adoption of limited liability by firms in the years following legal reforms. We construct 
an alternative model that accounts for this and other features of the nineteenth century 
British experience. In the model, project risk is private information, and a firm’s decision 
to adopt limited liability may be interpreted in equilibrium as a signal the firm is more 
likely to default. Hence less risky firms may choose unlimited liability or forego 
investments entirely. We show the choice of liability rule can lead to “development 
traps,” in which profitable investments are not undertaken, through its effect on 
equilibrium beliefs of uninformed investors in the economy. 
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JEL code: D24, D92.1 Introduction
The advent in the nineteenth century of the limited liability corporation
is typically regarded as a key step in the development of modern capital
markets and a precursor of large-scale industrialization. In the traditional
view, limited liability reduced transactions costs associated with issuing mar-
ketable securities, which in turn permitted improved risk sharing and invest-
ment on a larger scale than previously.1
This perspective on the incorporation decision leaves unexplained a num-
ber of aspects of the historical experience with liability reform. In Great
Britain, for example, ﬁrms were extremely slow to incorporate following
the introduction of general limited liability in 1856; most large-scale ﬁrms
in many industries remained partnerships until the end of the century, rely-
ing on private and internal sources of ﬁnance in lieu of new debt and equity
issues. This decision apparently reﬂected a widespread belief that limited
ﬁrms were riskier than average and would face higher costs of capital. In-
deed, we present new evidence below that default rates were higher among
the earliest limited ﬁrms. Moreover, the traditional view suggests that liabil-
ity reform, in reducing transactions costs, should lead to a rise in economic
activity and efﬁciency. In fact, British economic growth in the late nine-
teenth century appears to have lagged behind that of Germany, the U.S.,
and other countries that had introduced the corporate form much earlier.
In this paper, we analyze the effects liability rules can have on incorpo-
ration and investment decisions of ﬁrms. In the traditional view (Posner,
1976, e.g.), the transfer of risk from shareholders to creditors associated
with incorporation should have no impact on the ﬁrm’s cost of capital or
level of investment, as yields on limited liability debt should rise to compen-
sate bondholders for the risk of default. Equity investors therefore receive
no transfer through the choice of liability regime, and the value of the ﬁrm
remains unchanged. Thus limited liability was not a boon to shareholders,
nor did it reduce the cost of capital for ﬁrms, except through its indirect
effects on transactions costs in securities markets.
In contrast, we argue that liability rules can indeed have real effects on
the economy, through their impact on the degree of adverse selection in cor-
porate capital markets. In the model, as with Posner’s argument, adoption
of limited liability yields a risk premium on the ﬁrm’s debt in equilibrium. In
contrast, however, the equilibrium risk premium in the model reﬂects that
1For example, Manne (1967) discusses the difﬁculties in recovering debts from share-
holders under a regime of unlimited liability.
2of the average ﬁrm: low-risk ﬁrms therefore pay too much for debt, while
high-risk ﬁrms are subsidized in equilibrium. We study how the resulting
adverse selection among limited liability ﬁrms affects investment in equilib-
rium, and how the degree of adverse selection can in turn be inﬂuenced by
the level of transactions costs ﬁrms must incur to obtain limited liability.
We summarize the results of the paper as follows. Section 2 discusses
the introduction of the modern corporation in Great Britain in 1856. There
we cite historical evidence to suggest that the rate of new incorporations
following the reforms was extremely low, due at least in part to pessimistic
beliefs of investors about the average quality of limited companies. We also
produce new data which supports the adverse selection view: failure rates
among the earliest limited companies were indeed signiﬁcantly higher than
for a comparable sample of unlimited companies.
Section 3 introduces our model of adverse selection in limited and un-
limited liability credit markets. In Section 4 we show that, when ﬁrms may
choose their liability status, credit markets can have multiple equilibria, each
associated with different, self-fulﬁlling beliefs of investors about the average
quality of limited companies and different levels of aggregate investment.
Consequently, “animal spirits” of investors play a crucial role in avoiding de-
velopment traps. We then study the effects of a reform that lowers the costs
of incorporation for ﬁrms. We show that such a reform tends to increase
the number of incorporations and the level of investment in the economy.
Because multiple equilibria typically exist in the market, the timing of this
response is difﬁcult to predict. The effect of reforms on equilibrium interest
rates and adverse selection is more ambiguous, however. We show that in
some cases interest rates initially fall and then rise as the costs of incorpo-
ration decrease, as ﬁrst high-quality then low-quality ﬁrms are induced to
incorporate. Section 5 discusses the qualitative implications of our formal
results, and section 6 concludes.
Since our interest is in incorporation and default, the body of the paper
focuses on credit (bond) market equilibrium. However, nineteenth century
corporations also raised funds through equity issues. In order to demon-
strate that both our results and insights also apply to more general environ-
ments, in an appendix we extend the model so that entrepreneur can issue
outside debt and/or equity. We ﬁnd that although the existence of an eq-
uity market may attenuate the adverse selection effect in the incorporation
decision, it cannot, in general, eliminate it.
32 Liability reform in Great Britain
2.1 Previous literature
General limited liability began in Great Britain with the Joint-Stock Compa-
nies Act of 1856, which permitted companies to limit the liability of equity
owners for the company’s debts to be no greater than their initial invest-
ment.2 Limited liability was to be generally available to ﬁrms for a fee—a
speciﬁc act of Parliament had previously been required for each ﬁrm desir-
ing limited status—but new disclosure requirements would be imposed on
limited ﬁrms.
A puzzling feature of the British experience is the exceptionally slow
development of corporate capital markets in the period following the re-
forms. Many early ﬁrms established with limited liability were small and
not particularly long-lived (Heaton, 1948). Retentions remained the most
important source of ﬁnance throughout the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury (Payne, 1978). This slow rate of incorporation was particularly evident
among, but not conﬁned to, family-operated ﬁrms. In this regard, the expe-
rience of English companies appears to have differed from that of companies
in Germany, the United States, and other countries, during the period. As
Forbes (1986) notes, the reluctance to adopt limited liability in England is
particularly striking, given that liability reform occurred later and industrial
capital demands were higher there than in the United States.3
The reluctance of investors to accept limited liability seems to have been
associated with the belief that limited companies would be more prone
to default, fraud, and other malfeasance. Contemporary accounts suggest
that investors and policy-makers alike were concerned with the way lia-
bility rules affected the potential for malfeasance by stock promoters and
the functioning of capital markets in general. To its opponents, liability re-
form would lead to fraud and excessive risk taking, according to Shannon
(1931), and enterprise would function better if “kept within salutary bounds
by dread of loss.” (p. 374) The debates in Hansard in the period prior to
1856 indicated general concern that incorporation would undermine the
reputation of British merchants with trading partners and general creditors.
Hannah (1976) notes that “even those who accepted ... its favorable effects
2Prior to 1856, limited liability could be obtained only by special act of Parliament, ap-
parently a very expensive process undertaken by relatively few ﬁrms.
3Between 1863 and 1890, the number of corporate ﬁrms in England grew by 400 per
cent, compared to almost 1400 per cent in the United States during the same period Forbes
(1986).
4on investment saw little future for the new companies.... Suppliers and
customers, it was thought, would be reluctant to deal with them.” (p. 20)
Indeed, these pessimistic beliefs appear largely to have been borne out
in the experience of limited ﬁrms in the generation following the 1856 re-
form. Shannon (1932) reported that, of 4839 incorporations in the 1856-65
period, 50.1 per cent ceased operation within three years and 58.5 per cent
within ﬁve years.4 These failure rates are particularly high, given that the
sample is restricted to publicly traded joint-stock companies, which presum-
ably were among the most stable ﬁrms in the period. This record of failure
was related to the reluctance of large ﬁrms to adopt limited liability. By
the 1880s, less than 10 per cent of large-scale businesses had incorporated
Forbes (1986).
2.2 New evidence
While Shannon’s data are suggestive of high default risk among early lim-
ited liability corporations, they are not particularly conclusive. High default
rates might have been common among all ﬁrms in the period, including part-
nerships and unlimited liability companies. For this reason, we collected
new data for the period and compare failure rates of limited and unlim-
ited corporations in the period immediately following the 1856 reform. To
do so we exploit a “grandparent” provision of the 1856 legislation: joint-
stock companies which had been registered under earlier legislation, and
which by statute operated with unlimited liability, were required to register
again under the new Act, claiming either limited or unlimited liability. Ap-
proximately one-third of these existing ﬁrms chose to adopt limited liability,
while the rest continued to operate as before. Thus comparing default rates
of the two classes of ﬁrms appears the most appropriate way to determine
whether there was in fact adverse selection among early limited companies.
Both groups operated at the same time and comprise approximately the
same age-distribution of ﬁrms. Moreover, it is possible to control for innate
differences in risk among industries in making the comparison.
The data for the study are derived from an 1864 report by the Registrar
of Companies to Parliament,5 which records the liability choices and op-
4Many of these companies failed very soon after incorporations, and so might not have
raised much capital from outside investors. If these companies are excluded, more conser-
vative estimates of the failure rates are obtained: 22.3 per cent after three years and 35.4
per cent after ﬁve years.
5Return of Names, Places of Business, Date of Registration, Nominal Capital, and Number of
Shares of Joint Stock Companies, 1864 (452) LVIII.291.
5Table 1: Failure rates, by industry and liability status
Number Failure rate by liability status:
Industry of ﬁrms Unlimited Limited Difference
Mining and smelting 55 0·70 0·53 −0·16
(0·13)
Manufacturing 309 0·11 0·20 0·09∗
(0·04)
Trade and commerce 76 0·05 0·28 0·23∗
(0·08)
Transportation 31 0·50 0·19 −0·31
(0·17)
Finance and real estate 63 0·21 0·27 0·06
(0·12)
All industries 534 0·17 0·27 0·10∗
(0·04)
Notes: Standard errors of differences in parentheses. Differences
marked with an asterisk are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent level.
erating status of corporations registering under the Act between 1856 and
1864. In the analysis, we focus on the subsample of 534 English companies
which were in existence at the time of passage of the Act and which had
re-registered prior to 1861; 186 of these adopted limited liability, while the
remaining 348 retained unlimited liability.
Table 1 records the failure rates of ﬁrms in the sample by broad industry
category and by chosen liability status. The table indicates that 27 per cent
of limited ﬁrms and 17 per cent of unlimited ﬁrms had failed by 1864; the
difference in aggregate failure rates is signiﬁcantly different from zero at
the ﬁve per cent level. Failure rates were higher for limited ﬁrms in three
of our ﬁve broad industry groups. In two industries—manufacturing, which
includes public utilities, and trade and commerce, which includes a num-
ber of overseas trading ventures—the difference is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per
cent level. Arguably, problems of asymmetric information may have been
greater among ﬁrms operating abroad, which could explain the greater ev-
idence of adverse selection in the latter industry. Failure rates were in fact
lower among limited ﬁrms in the remaining two industries, although not
signiﬁcantly so. The difference is more pronounced among ﬁrms in the
6transportation sector, which includes a number of municipal and regional
railways. Since the large railways had earlier been incorporated with lim-
ited liability by separate acts of Parliament, investors may have been less
troubled by the risks of limited liability in this sector, so that no adverse
selection occurred. Thus the data are broadly indicative of the notion that
ﬁrms choosing limited liability were more likely to fail, and that adverse
selection may have occurred.
In summary, historical evidence suggests that ﬁrms were slow to adopt
limited liability in Great Britain, despite the signiﬁcant liberalizations of the
1856 reforms. Most large, private ﬁrms continued to operate as partner-
ships, with unlimited liability, until late in the century. Contemporary ac-
counts suggest the reluctance of ﬁrms to incorporate was strongly linked
to the perception that limited ﬁrm posed greater risk of failure for credi-
tors and equity investors. (Indeed, this perception appears to have played a
role in the delayed introduction of limited liability in Great Britain, as many
policy makers feared limited liability could lead to a crisis of conﬁdence in
capital markets.) Our data indicate this perception may have been accurate.
In a small sample of highly comparable ﬁrms, limited liability companies
failed with signiﬁcantly greater probability than unlimited liability compa-
nies, even over a short period of time. Thus adverse selection among limited
liability companies appears to have been a reality.
3 A model of debt ﬁnance
At date 0 an entrepreneur is endowed with an investment project that re-
quires a capital outlay of K. With probability p, the project is successful and
pays A/p at date 1; with complementary probability it is unsuccessful and
pays nothing. There are two types of investment projects. A safe project,
S, is successful with probability pS and a risky project, R, is successful with
probability pR >0, where pS > pR. Note that both the safe and risky projects
have an expected payoff of A.
An entrepreneur can be either wealthy, W, or poor, P. A wealthy en-
trepreneur receives an exogenous private wealth payoff of w > K at date 1,
while a poor entrepreneur receives nothing. An entrepreneur is thus one of
four possible types, where his type depends upon project risk, S or R, and his
wealth, W or P. An entrepreneur’s type is denoted by t ∈ {RP,SP,RW,SW}.
The prior probability that the entrepreneur is wealthy is ω, where 0<ω<1,
and the prior probability that he is endowed with the safe project is σ, where
0 < σ < 1. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the
7two characteristics that deﬁne the entrepreneur’s type are independently
distributed. So, for example, the probability that the entrepreneur is of type
RW is (1−σ)ω.
The entrepreneur does not have any liquid assets that can be used to ﬁ-
nance the investment opportunity at date 0. He must, therefore, raise funds
in capital markets if he wishes to undertake the project. The entrepreneur
can borrow funds from capital markets in one of two ways. First, the en-
trepreneur can issue limited liability debt. Historical evidence from both
the UK and US indicates that it was costly to issue limited liability debt. We
model this cost by assuming that the entrepreneur must incorporate in order
to be able to issue limited liability debt and that the cost of incorporation is
B > 0. Hence, an incorporated entrepreneur issues limited liability debt in
exchange for K +B. Second, the entrepreneur can issue unlimited liability
debt. Issuing unlimited liability debt does not require that the entrepreneur
incorporate. Hence, an unincorporated entrepreneur will issue unlimited
liability debt in exchange for K.
We assume that the incorporation cost B is below the threshold level
¯ B = A−K at which projects are proﬁtable even when undertaken by limited
liability borrowing, i.e., A−K −B ≥0 for B ≤ ¯ B.
If the entrepreneur issues limited liability debt, then the lender is only
able to extract the promised debt payment from the project’s payoff. That
is, if the entrepreneur fails to make the promised payment, the creditor
can only seize the value of the entrepreneur’s project, up to the promised
face value of debt. If the entrepreneur ﬁnances his investment project with
unlimited liability debt, then the lender is able to extract the promised pay-
ment from both the project payoff and the entrepreneur’s private wealth. If
the entrepreneur fails to repay his unlimited liability debt in full because he
lacks resources, then he suffers a large loss in utility.6
At date 0, the entrepreneur’s type is private information. We assume
6Borrowers who failed to repay their debts were put in debtors’ prison. Historical evi-
dence suggests that this was not a very pleasant outcome. Alternatively, if one does not want
to appeal to a large loss in utility associated with failure to repay unlimited liability debt,
one can instead assume that the entrepreneur’s date 1 wealth is partially provable. That is,
if a entrepreneur is wealthy, he can prove that he is, in fact, wealthy by, for example, pro-
viding appropriate documentation. However, by withholding this documentation, a wealthy
entrepreneur will be observationally equivalent to a poor entrepreneur at date 0. Under
the assumption of partial provability, it can be shown, that investors will extend unlimited
liability loans only to those entrepreneurs who can prove they are wealthy. Hence, assuming
partially provability of wealth will generate identical equilibrium outcomes to assuming that
anyone can borrow using unlimited liability debt, but failure to pay entails a large loss in
utility.
8that there exist at least two lenders in the capital market, each with enough
resources to satisfy the entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing needs. At date 1, the lender
can observe both the project payoff and the entrepreneur’s wealth. The
entrepreneur and lenders are risk neutral. For simplicity, we assume that
personal discount rates and the riskless interest rate are zero.
The timing of the investment-ﬁnancing game is as follows. At date 0,
the entrepreneur chooses to: (i) incorporate and attempt to obtain K +B in
capital markets by issuing limited liability debt, (ii) remain unincorporated
and attempt to obtain K in capital markets by issuing unlimited liability
debt, or (iii) completely forego the investment project and exit the market.
Lenders observe these actions. If a lender decides to extend capital to the
entrepreneur, then he offers a (gross) interest rate, r, to the entrepreneur.
The entrepreneur will accept ﬁnancing from the lender offering the lowest
interest rate, r, and invests in the project. If the entrepreneur issues unlim-
ited liability debt, then he receives K at date 0 and promises to pay back Kr
at date 1; if he issues limited liability debt, then he receives K +B at date
0 and promises to pay back (K +B)r at date 1. At date 1, the investment
project pays either A/p or 0. If the entrepreneur is wealthy, he receives an
additional payoff of w at this time. Payments are exchanged between the
entrepreneur and the lender as speciﬁed in their debt contract and the game
ends.
The equilibrium concept that we will adopt is a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium, (PBE). A PBE for our game speciﬁes:
1. a strategy for each type of entrepreneur, where the entrepreneur’s
strategy is
(a) to incorporate and seek limited liability funding; to remain unin-
corporated and seek unlimited liability funding; or to forego the
investment project and exit the market
(b) to choose a lender (if investment funds are forthcoming) on the
basis of the gross interest rate offered by all lenders.
2. a strategy for each lender, where a lender’s strategy is to offer to pro-
vide, or not, investment funding K for an unincorporated entrepreneur
and K +B for an incorporated entrepreneur and, if funding is offered,
a gross interest rate, r.
3. beliefs that lenders hold about entrepreneurial type.
Strategies and beliefs satisfy sequential rationality and, whenever possible,
Bayes’ rule.
94 Analysis with Debt Finance
The historical puzzle that we are addressing is that, loosely speaking, in the
latter half of the nineteenth century the costs associated with incorporation—
and, hence, the cost of issuing limited liability debt—dramatically fell in
both the US and the UK. Borrowers in the US responded in great numbers
by switching from unlimited liability to limited liability debt ﬁnance, while
the in UK borrowers by and large continued to ﬁnance with unlimited lia-
bility debt. We are interested in understanding how changes in the cost of
incorporation, B, affect the level of investment and the method of ﬁnance.
In this section we will characterize the various equilibrium conﬁgurations
that may arise and describe how an equilibrium is affected when the cost of
incorporation is changed.
Since there is a large penalty associated with defaulting on unlimited
liability debt, a poor entrepreneur’s expected payoff will be negative if he
borrows with unlimited liability debt. Therefore, any entrepreneur who
ﬁnances with unlimited liability debt is wealthy. Competition among lenders
implies that the gross rate of interest for an unlimited liability loan is equal
to one, since such a loan carries no risk. The expected project payoff for
a wealthy entrepreneur who ﬁnances his investment project with unlimited
liability debt, V U, is simply V U = A−K.
Let π represent a lender’s belief about the success rate of a project that is
ﬁnanced with limited liability debt and let rπ represent the gross interest rate
charged for a limited liability loan by a lender with belief π. Competition
implies that rπ generates zero expected proﬁts for lenders. The interest
rate rπ equates total amount loaned out, K +B, with the expected payoff
associated with the loan, π[rπ(K +B)]. Zero expected proﬁts for lenders







Denote the expected project payoff to an entrepreneur with success prob-
ability p who ﬁnances with limited liability debt by




From (1), note that V L(p) ≥ 0 for all p ≤ π. Therefore, the RP-type en-
trepreneur will always invest in the project—using limited liability debt—
because the interest rate charged for a limited liability loan is rπ ≤ 1/pR
10or pR/π≤1; this implies that the project will generate a strictly positive ex-
pected payoff of at least A−K −B. Because the RP-type entrepreneur always
borrows with limited liability debt, it will always be the case that rπ >1/pS.
As a result, the SW-type entrepreneur will never ﬁnance with limited lia-
bility debt, since the expected payoff associated with this strategy is strictly
less than V U = A −K. Therefore, two of the four possible entrepreneurial
types have dominant strategies: the RP-type entrepreneur always invests
and ﬁnances with limited liability debt and the SW-type entrepreneur al-
ways invests and ﬁnances with unlimited liability debt.
The remainder of the analysis explores the investment and ﬁnancing
strategies of the RW- and SP-type entrepreneurs. The RW-type entrepreneur
always invests in the project since he can obtain an expected project payoff
of at least V U = A−K > 0 by ﬁnancing with unlimited liability debt. How-
ever, depending upon the interest rate that prevails for limited liability debt,
the SP-type entrepreneur may or may not invest. So the analysis boils down
to understanding the conditions under which
1. the SP-type entrepreneur chooses to invest (or not), and
2. the RW-type entrepreneur chooses to ﬁnance with limited or unlim-
ited liability debt.
Before we characterize the various equilibrium outcomes, we can iden-
tify a situation that cannot arise in equilibrium when B > 0: one in which
the SP-type entrepreneur exits the market and does not invest, while the
RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances his investment with limited liability debt. In
this situation, the interest rate on limited liability debt will be equal to 1/pR
since only risky entrepreneurs—RP- and RW-types—issue limited liability
debt. The project payoff to an RW-type entrepreneur is A−K −B because he
ﬁnances his investment with unlimited liability debt. But this entrepreneur
can obtain an expected project payoff of V U = A−K if he ﬁnances with un-
limited liability debt, since he avoids the incorporation cost, B, associated
with limited liability debt.
The issue facing the SP-type entrepreneur is whether or not to invest;
if he invests, then he always ﬁnances with limited liability debt. The SP-
type entrepreneur will invest in the project if the expected project payoff is









11otherwise he foregoes the investment and exits the market. The gross inter-
est rate rSP represents the interest rate on a limited liability loan that makes
the SP-type entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and exiting the
market. If the lender charges less than this critical rate, then SP-type en-
trepreneur strictly prefers to invest in the project rather than exit the market.
In what follows it will be convenient to deﬁne the parameters RI ≡ A/K > 1
and p∆ ≡ pS/pR >1. Using this notation, the condition for which the SP-type










where a strict inequality in (2) implies that SP-type entrepreneur invests
with probability one. The parameter RI can be interpreted as a measure
of the expected gross rate of return for the project and p∆ as a measure
of the dispersion in lenders’ priors about project risk. We will say that RI
measures the “investment effect” on the equilibrium, while p∆ measures the
“adverse selection effect.” From (2) we can see that, holding all else con-
stant, a higher value of RI will motivate the SP-type entrepreneur to invest.
In contrast, inequality (2) tells us that, holding all else constant, a higher
value of p∆ will motivate the SP-type entrepreneur type to exit the market.
Note also from (2) that, holding lender beliefs constant, smaller incorpora-
tion costs B are conducive to investment by the SP-type entrepreneur.
The issue facing the RW-type entrepreneur is how to ﬁnance the invest-
ment project. If the RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances with unlimited liability
debt, then his project payoff is V U = A−K. If, however, he ﬁnances using















otherwise he will ﬁnance with unlimited liability debt. The gross interest
rate rRW represents the critical interest rate that makes the RW- type en-
trepreneur indifferent between ﬁnancing with limited liability debt and ﬁ-
nancing with unlimited liability debt. Since ﬁnancing with unlimited liabil-
ity debt does not entail any incorporation costs, the RW-type entrepreneur
will ﬁnance with limited liability debt only if the gross interest rate is strictly
less than 1/pR. (Note that the above inequality tells us that rRW < 1/pR) As
12above, it will be convenient to rewrite the condition under which the RW-








where a strict inequality implies that the RW-type entrepreneur incorporates
and issues limited liability debt with probability one. In contrast to (2), the
investment effect RI is absent in (3), since the RW-type entrepreneur al-
ways invests. As in the case for the SP-type entrepreneur, a lower value
for the incorporation cost B makes limited liability ﬁnance more attractive.
The RW-type entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing decision depends upon the degree of
adverse selection in the market, which is clear when we rewrite π/pR as
πp∆/pS. Intuitively, a higher value of p∆ is favorable for the RW-type en-
trepreneur since the interest rate on limited liability debt puts some weight
project success probability pS, which lowers the cost of borrowing for a risky
entrepreneur. So, in accordance with intuition, inequality (3) tells us that,
holding all else constant, a higher value of p∆ will motivate the RW-type
entrepreneur to ﬁnance with limited liability debt.
Considering the various strategies that the SP- and RW-type entrepreneurs
may adopt, we see that there are four qualitatively distinct equilibrium con-
ﬁgurations that can arise:
1. an underinvestment equilibrium is one where the SP-type entrepreneur,
with probability one, does not invest.
2. a wealth separation equilibrium is one where all entrepreneurs invest
and all wealthy entrepreneurs ﬁnance with unlimited liability debt and
all poor entrepreneurs ﬁnance with limited liability debt.
3. a limited liability equilibrium is one where all entrepreneurs invest and
with positive probability the RW-type ﬁnances with limited liability
debt.
4. an limited liability-underinvestment equilibrium is one where the SP-
type entrepreneur invests with positive probability (less than one), all
other entrepreneurial types invest with probability one, and the RW-
type entrepreneur ﬁnances his investment with limited liability debt.
Note that there is an adverse selection effect operation in equilibrium
conﬁgurations 1, 3 and 4. In equilibrium conﬁguration 1, the SP-type en-
trepreneur has a valuable investment project but because the market in-
terest rate is “high” he does not invest; in equilibrium conﬁguration 3, the
13RW-type entrepreneur increases the borrowing rate on limited liability debt;
and in equilibrium 4, the SP-type entrepreneur does not invest with posi-
tive probability. In equilibrium conﬁguration 2, wealthy entrepreneurs pay
the appropriate risk adjusted borrowing rate and both types of poor en-
trepreneurs invest by using limited liability debt. Observe that these equi-
librium conﬁgurations may be ranked (weakly) by the associated average
level of investment and propensity of entrepreneurs to incorporate and is-
sue limited liability debt. Equilibrium conﬁguration 1 has the lowest levels
of investment; equilibrium conﬁguration 4 has higher levels of investment;
and equilibrium conﬁgurations 2 and 3 have the highest. As the foregoing
discussion suggests, an underinvestment equilibrium is most likely to arise
when the gross productivity of investment projects is small relative to the
potential for adverse selection, in the sense that RI is small relative to p∆.
We, therefore, proceed by characterizing the various equilibrium outcomes
assuming ﬁrst that the adverse selection effect dominates the investment ef-
fect, in the sense that RI ≤ p∆, and then assuming the opposite, that RI > p∆.
We emphasize that virtually all of the following analysis that follows simply
considers the interaction of inequalities (2) and (3).
4.1 Equilibria: adverse selection effect dominates the invest-
ment effect
Intuitively, when the adverse selection effect dominates the investment ef-
fect, i.e., when p∆ ≥RI, a likely outcome is that there will be market failure,
i.e. underinvestment. The reasoning is as follows. The cost of capital, rπ,
depends upon lenders’ beliefs about project success, which, in equilibrium,
depends on the actual probabilities of incorporation by the safe- and risky-
type entrepreneurs. Investment by the SP-type entrepreneur creates a pos-
itive externality for the RW-type entrepreneur, to the extent that it lowers
the cost of capital ﬁnanced with limited liability loans. At the same time,
however, incorporation by the RW-type entrepreneur creates a negative ex-
ternality for the SP-type entrepreneur, which reduces the attractiveness of
ﬁnancing investment with limited liability debt relative to not investing at
all. We now show that when the adverse selection effect dominates the
investment effect, this latter externality is sufﬁciently strong to make the
investment unproﬁtable for the SP-type entrepreneur.
If an underinvestment equilibrium exists, then the interest rate on lim-
ited liability debt must be equal to 1/pR because the RP-type entrepreneur is
the only entrepreneur that ﬁnances with limited liability debt. In this equi-
librium, π= pR and, since p∆ ≥RI, inequality (2) can never hold for strictly










which implies that the SP-type entrepreneur strictly prefers not to invest.
Since the interest rate on limited liability debt is equal to 1/pR and it costs
B to issue limited liability debt, the RW-type entrepreneur has no incentive
to incorporate and ﬁnance with limited liability debt. This establishes:
Proposition 1: If p∆ ≥ RI, then an underinvestment equilibrium exists for all
B>0.
Next, consider the possibility of a wealth separation equilibrium, in which
the RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances with unlimited liability debt, while the
SP-type entrepreneur invests and ﬁnances with limited liability debt. In-
tuitively, if lenders believe the SP-type entrepreneur will invest, then the
interest rate on limited liability debt will turn out to be sufﬁciently low so
that the RW-type entrepreneur also prefers to ﬁnance with limited liabil-
ity debt. But, an interest rate on limited liability ﬁnance that deters the
RW-type entrepreneur from using it will also deter investment by the SP-
type entrepreneur. To see this, suppose that a wealth separation equilibrium
exists. Then inequality (2) must hold, and inequality (3) cannot, where












But these inequalities cannot simultaneously hold since p∆ ≥ RI and B > 0.
Hence,
Proposition 2: If p∆ ≥RI, then a wealth separation equilibrium does not exist
for any B>0.
Consider now the limited liability equilibrium conﬁguration, where the
SP-type entrepreneur invests with probability one and the RW-type en-
trepreneur uses limited liability debt with probability µ. Let π(µ) represent












15Note that π(µ) is decreasing in µ: if the RW-type entrepreneur chooses lim-
ited liability ﬁnance with a higher probability, then the lender’s belief about
project success must fall. A limited liability equilibrium will exist if both
(2) and (3) hold. But, since p∆ > RI, if (2) holds, then (3) holds strictly,
which implies that the RW-type entrepreneur strictly prefers to ﬁnance with
limited liability debt whenever the SP-type entrepreneur invests. It follows
that the only limited liability equilibrium in this case is one in pure strate-
gies, and it sufﬁces to consider lenders’ equilibrium beliefs about project








where P(R|RW) denotes the posterior probability that a project ﬁnanced
with limited liability debt is a risky, given that the RW-type entrepreneur
incorporates with probability one. A limited liability equilibrium will, there-






Substituting for π(µ=1) in the above inequality, we see that a limited liabil-










However, since the proposed equilibrium has p∆ ≥RI and P(R|RW)<1, it is
not possible for condition (6) to hold; this, in turn, means that inequality













We can summarize this discussion by:
Proposition 3: If p∆ ≥RI, then a wealth separation equilibrium does not exist
for any B>0.
Finally, a limited liability-underinvestment equilibrium requires that an
SP-type entrepreneur be indifferent between investing and not and that the
RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnance with limited liability debt with probability

























represents the probability that the project is successful given that the SP-
type entrepreneur invests with probability φ. Condition (8) says that the SP-













. If φ = 1, then














increasing in φ, the left-hand side of (8) will exceed the right-hand side for
all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1; hence, condition (8) can never hold. We can summarize this
discussion by:
Proposition 4: If p∆ ≥ RI, then the limited liability-underinvestment equilib-
rium doess not exist for any B>0.
In summary, propositions 1-4 imply that when the adverse selection ef-
fect dominates the investment effect, the equilibrium outcome is always
characterized by underinvestment: the SP-type entrepreneur will exit the
market and will not invest. As well, all wealthy entrepreneur ﬁnance their
investment with unlimited liability debt and limited liability debt is “risky,”
i.e., r =1/pR, as only the RP-type entrepreneur uses it.
4.2 Equilibria: investment dominates the adverse selection
When RI > p∆, the investment effect dominates the adverse selection ef-
fect, and the possibility of market failure is diminished. Unlike the analysis
above, now an underinvestment equilibrium need not always exist. Such
an equilibrium exists only if inequality (2) does not hold when the lender’s
beliefs satisfy π= pR. That is, an underinvestment equilibrium exists only if
1+B/K ≥RI/p∆.
Clearly, for B sufﬁciently “high,” this inequality can exist. However, since
RI > p∆, we can have 1+B/K <RI/p∆ for B sufﬁciently “small.” At these low
levels of B, the SP-type entrepreneur prefers to invest in the project even if
17the cost of capital is 1/pR. This is because the gross rate of return on the
investment is sufﬁciently high to offset even the maximal cost of adverse
selection in the debt market. This establishes,






When the investment is sufﬁciently productive relative to adverse se-
lection, i.e., when RI > p∆, the SP-type entrepreneur may be willing to
invest even if the cost of capital is equal to 1/pR. As well, since the ad-
verse selection effect is relatively small, the RW-type entrepreneur may not
have an incentive to ﬁnance with limited liability debt even when both the
RW- and SP-type entrepreneurs use this kind of ﬁnance. To see this, note
that a wealth separation equilibrium—one where rich entrepreneurs use un-
limited liability ﬁnance and poor entrepreneurs use limited liability—exists




























> pR, the interval is non-empty for some B >0; hence,
Proposition 6: If RI > p∆, then a wealth separation equilibrium exists for
























When a wealth separation equilibrium exists, the choice of ﬁnancial in-
struments is “neutral” in the cross-section: the cost of capital is unrelated to
the decision to incorporate, and all ﬁrms invest optimally in equilibrium.
In a limited liability equilibrium, the SP-type entrepreneur incorporates
and invests with probability one, the RW-type entrepreneur incorporates
and ﬁnances with limited liability debt with probability µ∈(0,1], and lenders’
beliefs are given by the expected default probability π(µ) deﬁned in (5).
18From (2) and (3), one can see that the necessary condition for this equilib-








That is, when the RW-type entrepreneur weakly prefers to ﬁnance with lim-
ited liability debt, the SP-type entrepreneur strictly prefers to invest because
R > p∆. Let ˆ B0 denote the highest incorporation cost consistent with the
RW-type entrepreneur being indifferent between ﬁnancing with limited or








(Note that ˆ B0 is equal to the lower bound in the interval described in propo-
sition 6.) Let ˆ B1 < ˆ B0 denote the lowest incorporation cost consistent with
the RW-type entrepreneur being indifferent between ﬁnancing with limited








In equilibrium, the probability with which the RW-type entrepreneur incor-
porates and ﬁnances with limited liability debt depends on the size of the
incorporation costs, B. If B = ˆ B0, then the RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances
with unlimited liability debt with probability one; if ˆ B1 < B < ˆ B0, then the
RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances his investment with limited liability debt
with probability µ∈(0,1), where µ solves 1+B/K =π(µ)/pR, and, with prob-
ability 1−µ, he ﬁnances with unlimited liability debt; ﬁnally if B ≤ ˆ B1, then
the RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances with limited liability debt with probabil-
ity one. When B ≤ ˆ B0, in equilibrium, the SP-type entrepreneur invests with
probability one. The interest rate that lenders’ offer for ﬁnancing limited lia-




for ˆ B1 ≤B ≤ ˆ B0; when B < ˆ B1, the interest rate on limited




. Note that on the interval ( ˆ B1, ˆ B0), the probability
that the RW-type entrepreneur incorporates is a strictly decreasing function
of B, which in turn strictly decreases the expected default rate on limited
liability debt. Thus we have,
Proposition 7: If RI > p∆, then a limited liability equilibrium exists if the in-
corporation cost, B, is less than ˆ B0; the RW-type entrepreneur will incorporate
with probability one if B ≤ ˆ B1 and will incorporate with a probability less than
one, but greater than zero if ˆ B1 <B < ˆ B0.
19Although ﬁnancial structure is irrelevant in this equilibrium in the sense
that all proﬁtable investments are undertaken under some organizational
form, from the perspective of an individual entrepreneur it is not, and local
changes in the cost of incorporation have predictable effects on the equilib-
rium cost of capital and the default rate of corporate ﬁrms.
Finally, an unlimited liability-underinvestment equilibrium will exist if:
(i) the SP-type entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and not, i.e.,
condition (8), and (ii) the RW-type entrepreneur ﬁnances with unlimited











But since RI > p∆, it is not possible that conditions (8) and (9) can simulta-
neously hold. Therefore,
Proposition 8: If RI > p∆, then the limited liability-underinvestment equilib-
rium does not exist for any B>0.
Figure 1 characterizes the relationship between incorporation costs and
the equilibrium interest rate on limited liability debt in the various possible
equilibrium conﬁgurations. Proposition 5 showed that an underinvestment
equilibrium exists for 1+B/K ≥ RI/p∆; in this situation the equilibrium in-
terest rate on a limited liability loan is 1/pR. Proposition 6 showed that a

























/pR >1, there always exists values of B at which an
underinvestment equilibrium and a wealth separation equilibrium coexist.7
Proposition 7 showed that a limited liability equilibrium, where the RW-type















Again, an underinvestment equilibrium may coexist with a limited liability
equilibrium at a particular value of B or not, depending on the value of









7In the ﬁgure, we assume π0/pR > R/p∆, so that there exist parameter values at which






















Figure 1: The equilibrium correspondence when δ<θ.
5 Discussion
In terms of addressing the historical puzzle—a dramatic fall in the cost of
issuing limited liability debt in the US and UK resulted in a large increase
in the use of limited liability debt in the US and essentially no change in
the UK with similar outcomes for investment—our model can provide both
a “fundamental-driven” explanation and a “belief-driven” explanation.
The fundamental-driven explanation would start with the observation
that the capital/labor ratio in Britain was greater than that of the US in
the mid-19th century. Hence, the rate of return to capital in the US ex-
ceeded that in the UK. Supposing that the adverse selection effect, p∆, is
the same in both countries, then it is quite possible—owing to the differ-
ences in the rate of return on capital—that in the UK the adverse selection
effect dominates the investment effect and in the US the investment effect
dominates the adverse selection effect in the US. Therefore, in the UK, the
21only possible outcome is the underinvestment equilibrium, where the use of
limited liability debt is constrained and the level of investment is “low.” In
the US, however, as the cost of using limited liability falls, i.e., B falls, then,
the wealth separation and the limited liability equilibria can be supported,
where in both cases the level of investment will be “high” supported by the
use of limited liability debt.
The following deﬁnitions will be useful for a belief-driven explanation.
Lenders will be said to have “optimistic beliefs” if they hold highest possible
belief of project success for a limited liability ﬁnanced entrepreneur that is
consistent with an equilibrium and will be said to have “pessimistic beliefs”
if they hold the lowest possible belief. We will consider how equilibrium out-
comes are altered when the cost of incorporation falls under the scenarios
where lenders have optimistic beliefs and lenders have pessimistic beliefs.
If lenders have optimistic beliefs, then the level of investment and the
number of incorporations will increase as incorporation costs fall. This can
be seen in ﬁgure 1: As incorporation costs fall, ﬁrst there is an underinvest-
ment equilibrium, then a wealth separation equilibrium and ﬁnally a limited
liability equilibrium. On the other hand, if lenders have pessimistic beliefs,
the economy can experience stagnation, i.e., the economy is “stuck” in an
underinvestment equilibrium, even as the cost of incorporation become very
low. In ﬁgure 1, if investors have pessimistic beliefs, the incorporation costs
have to decline signiﬁcantly—below θ/δ— before the economy cannot be in
an underinvestment equilibrium.
The predicted relationship between incorporation costs and interest rates
on limited liability debt is however more subtle. When investment is rela-
tively high proﬁtability and investors have optimistic beliefs, observe that in-
terest rates initially fall and then rise as the costs of incorporation decrease,
as ﬁrst high-quality then low-quality ﬁrms are induced to incorporate. Thus
an apparent rise in interest rates following the reform need not signal an
unfavorable climate for investment.
These observations are consistent with an “animal spirits” theory of insti-
tutional reform and economic development. When investors hold optimistic
beliefs, the introduction of limited liability may induce a sharp decline in
the cost of capital and a concomitant rise in investment, even when the cost
of incorporation remains relatively high, while low investment may per-
sist after the reform under pessimistic beliefs. Of course, such beliefs are
self-fulﬁlling: a willingness of investors to hold limited liability debt is re-
warded by better-quality issuance on average, and so empirical default rates
that keep interest rates low. In this sense, the different experience of Great
Britain and the United States with liability reform might be interpreted as
22equilibrium phenomena, even without differences in economic fundamen-
tals in the two countries.
Some corporations in the mid-nineteenth century raised funds by issuing
both debt and equity. Does the introduction of equity ﬁnance affect any of
our results or insights? We explore this question in an appendix and ﬁnd
that, qualitatively speaking, all of our results remain intact. In fact, by re-
deﬁning variables in the environment where entrepreneurs can raise funds
by issuing debt and/or equity, the conditions for the existence of the various
equilibria, as well as the diagrammatic characterization of these equilib-
ria are observationally equivalent to the those that are characterized in the
main text, (i.e., when entrepreneurs can only raise funds by issuing either
limited or unlimited liability debt).
6 Conclusion
While our research was motivated by the evidence of development traps in
the period following British liability reforms, the model presented is quite
general. It is therefore natural to ask whether similar concerns arise in
the modern era. Indeed, there is evidence that entrepreneurs continue to
self-select in choosing liability status. Thus Horvath and Woywode (1996)
report that, for a sample of modern German ﬁrms, limited liability is more
likely to be adopted by ﬁrms that are riskier and that have greater capital
demands, which is consistent with our model. While self-selection appar-
ently persists, outside investors are considerably better informed now than
in the past, so that adverse selection problems are attenuated. For exam-
ple, there were very few reporting requirements for publicly traded compa-
nies in nineteenth-century Britain. Moreover, our model suggests that when
the transactions costs incurred to obtain limited liability are small relative
to total capital demands, underinvestment need not occur in equilibrium.
Speciﬁcally, an equilibrium with full investment always exists for B/K sufﬁ-
ciently small. Moreover, when gross returns to investment are large relative
to potential adverse selection costs (in the notation of the model, R > p∆)
the full investment equilibrium is unique when B/K is small. Thus devel-
opment traps are unlikely to occur in the model for the parameter values
that best represent the modern economic environment. We conclude that
the problems of liability choice we have identiﬁed are probably of greatest
relevance in periods of transition, such as nineteenth century Britain.
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24Appendix
Thus far we have restricted ﬁnancing to take the form of debt. In the
nineteenth century, ﬁrms also had the option to ﬁnance their investment
projects by issuing equity. In this section we examine how our insights and
results are affected when ﬁrms may issue equity in addition to debt. Since
equity, like limited liability debt, does not guarantee a certain payoff to the
holder, we assume that a ﬁrm that issues equity must become incorporated.
We have to slightly alter the model in the main text to allow for both equity
and debt ﬁnance.
A1 A Model with Debt and Equity
We consider a minimal extension of the model in the main text that incor-
porates an equity market. To make the debt-equity decision a non-trivial
one, we introduce a moral hazard problem: at the beginning of date 1—
before the project pays off—the entrepreneur must choose either to “work
hard” (e = 1) or “shirk” (e = 0). With probability p the project is successful
and pays [eA+(1−e)A0]/p at date 1 and with complementary probability is
unsuccessful and pays nothing. Thus a successful project pays A/p if the
entrepreneur works hard (e = 1) and pays A0/p if the entrepreneur shirks
(e = 0), where A0 < A. When the entrepreneur works hard he incurs a pri-
vate cost equal to c >0 for each unit of expected project payoff that exceeds
A0. Hence, the total cost that the entrepreneur incurs for working hard is
c(A− A0).8
The timing of the investment-ﬁnancing game is as follows. At date 0, the
entrepreneur chooses to:
(i) incorporate and attempt to obtain K +B in capital markets by either
(a) issuing limited liability debt in exchange for D ∈ [0,K +B] units
of capital and issuing equity in exchange for K +B −D units of
capital.
(b) issuing unlimited liability debt in exchange for D ∈[0,K +B] units
of capital and issuing equity in exchange for K +B −D units of
capital.
8If this moral harzard problem was introduced into the “only debt ﬁnance” environment
of the main text, it would have no effect on analysis.
25(ii) remain unincorporated and obtain K in capital markets by issuing un-
limited liability debt
(iii) completely forego the investment project and exit the market.
Investors—potential creditors and equity holders—observe these actions. If
an investor decides to extend capital D ∈ [0,K +B] to the entrepreneur in
exchange for debt, then the investor offers a (gross) interest rate to the
entrepreneur. If an investor decides to extend capital K +B −D to the en-
trepreneur in exchange for equity, then the investor offers a fraction (1−α)
to the entrepreneur. The fraction (1−α) represents the share of the project’s
payoff, net of any debt payments, that goes to the equity holder. The en-
trepreneur will accept debt ﬁnancing from the lender who offers the lowest
interest rate and will accept equity ﬁnancing from the investor who offers
the smallest fraction (1−α). After ﬁnancing has been arranged, the project is
put into place. At date 1, the entrepreneur makes his effort decision: he ei-
ther works hard or shirks. The investment project pays either A/p or 0 if the
entrepreneur works hard, or either A0/p or 0 if he shirks. If the entrepreneur
is wealthy, he receives his private wealth payoff of w at this time. Payments
are exchanged between the entrepreneur and the investors as speciﬁed in
their debt and equity contracts and the game ends.
If the entrepreneur incorporates, issues unlimited liability debt and eq-
uity, and retains α ownership, 0≤ α≤1, then the payoff to (outside) equity
holders is (1−α)(P −F), where P represents the project payoff and F repre-
sents the promised payment to creditors. Note that it may be the case that
(1−α)(P −F) < 0.9 If the entrepreneur gets incorporated, issues limited lia-
bility debt and equity, and retains α ownership, then the payoff to (outside)
equity holders is (1−α)max{P −F,0}.





The ﬁrst inequality implies A−c(A− A0) > A0; that is, hard work maximizes
the value of the project. The second inequality gives the moral hazard prob-
lem some bite in equilibrium: Suppose that the project were undertaken
under limited liability with 100 per cent equity ﬁnance. If investors belief
that the entrepreneur will work hard, then in exchange for K +B units of
9For convenience, we will continue to assume that each investor has resources at least
equal to K +B.






Since under (A1), α∗ ≤(A−K)/A <c, we have
α∗A−c(A− A0)<α∗A0,
which implies that it is optimal for the entrepreneur to shirk at date 1 if
he obtains 100 per cent equity ﬁnance. To focus on the simplest, and most
interesting, case, we will assume that
A0 <K. ((A2))
Inequality (A2), in conjunction with inequalities (A1) implies that most debt
and equity will be required for investment ﬁnancing. (Inequality (A2) also
implies that shirking cannot occur in any perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
game.)
A2 Equilibrium
Let π(D) represent a lender’s belief about the success rate of the project
when the entrepreneur raises D units of capital via limited liability debt and
raises the remainder, K+B−D, by issuing equity. In equilibrium, competition
among investors will induce each lender to offer a gross interest rate rπ(D) =
1/π(D) for limited liability debt.
The expected residual or equity value of a corporation that has borrowed






where ¯ A(e)=eA+(1−e)A0. Because lenders and equity investors share com-
mon beliefs in equilibrium, the expected transfer from creditors to share-
holders through default is zero. This implies that a corporation’s equity
will never be mispriced.10 If D < K +B, then the entrepreneur must issue
(outside) equity and, in equilibrium, competition among investors will in-










10An implication of equity not being mispriced is that any problem which arises with the
introduction of limited liability is fundamentally about debt, and not about equity.
27An entrepreneur who incorporates and ﬁnances with limited liability
debt, in the amount of D, and retains α ownership in the corporation, will











Hence, in order for the entrepreneur to be induced to work hard, his stake
in the ﬁrm, α, can not be diluted below c. The minimum amount of debt ﬁ-
nance that is consistent with the entrepreneur working hard, denoted Dmin,





Since we assume that c > (A−K)/K, i.e., inequality (A1), it is necessarily
the case that Dmin >0.11 Note that the minimum fraction of ﬁrm ownership,
α = c, and the minimum amount of debt, D = Dmin, required to induce the
entrepreneur to work hard, is independent of whether the entrepreneur is
risky or safe. Deﬁne Dmin
0 = (K −(1−c)A)/c, i.e., Dmin
0 is simply Dmin evalu-
ated at B =0.





If D <Dmin, then the entrepreneur will shirk. But if the entrepreneur shirks,
the corporation will generate an expected payoff that is less than the re-
quired project investment of K +B since K > A0; investors will not provide
funds to the entrepreneur under these conditions. In what follows, we will
assume that if an entrepreneur ﬁnances his investment project with limited
debt, he will borrow Dmin units of capital and ﬁnance the remainder with
equity.12 Since we will assume that D =Dmin for the remainder of the paper,
we will denote π(Dmin) simply as π.
11Since A −(K +B) > 0, it is also the case that Dmin < K +B. It is straight forward to
demonstrate that Dmin < A0 <K.
12The investment-ﬁnancing game with debt and equity will typically have many equilibria
for a given belief of the investors. For example, suppose that there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium where (i) both SP- and RW-type entrepreneurs incorporate and ﬁnance the
project raising Dmin funds from limited liability debt and the rest from equity, and (ii) the
SP-type entrepreneur’s expected payoff is strictly greater than zero. Then there exists an
interval [Dmin,Dmax] such that for every D ∈ [Dmin,Dmax], there is perfect Bayesian equi-
librium where both SP- and RW-type entrepreneurs incorporate and ﬁnance the project by
raising D funds from limited liability debt and the rest from equity. Unfortunately, the Cho
and Kreps (1987) intuitive reﬁnement does not have much power in terms of eliminating
equilibria here. The SP-type entrepreneur would like to minimize that amount of debt that
28As above, both the RP- and SW-type entrepreneurs have dominant strate-
gies. The RP-type entrepreneur will use limited liability debt to borrow
Dminunits of capital and will obtain the rest by issuing equity. Since it costs
B to incorporate and the interest rate on limited liability debt is always
greater than rS, the SW-type will always fund his project using unlimited
liability debt. We can now turn to the investment and funding decisions of
the SP- and RW-type entrepreneurs. The issues facing these entrepreneurs
are the same as above: The SP-type entrepreneur must decide whether to
obtain funding for his investment project or to exit the market; RW-type
entrepreneur must decide whether to use unlimited liability debt or to in-
corporate and fund his project with a mix of limited liability debt and equity.
The SP-type entrepreneur will invest in the project if the expected project



































Recall that in all debt model of Section 3, we interpreted A/K as an in-
vestment effect. In a model with equity ﬁnance and costly entrepreneurial
effort, we will now interpret the investment effect as A
0
/K, and will denote
this investment effect as R0. Since only a fraction of investment ﬁnance is
he holds since he effectively subsidies the risky entrepreneurs debt and because equity is
appropriately priced. Suppose that the SP-type entrepreneur defects from a proposed equi-
librium by offering a level of debt that is lower than the proposed equilibrium value (but
greater than Dmin). If the investor treats this defector as a SP-type entrepreneur, then the
entrepreneur would receive ﬁnancing interest rate of rS. If defections were treated this way,
then the RW-type entrepreneur may also have an incentive to defect in this manner. In what
follows, we will effectively focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria that are consistent with the
Cho and Kreps (1987) D1 reﬁnement of out-of-equilibrium beliefs since this reﬁnement will
eliminate all capital structures that have more than Dmin capital raised by limited liability
debt. Hence, it is for this reason that we restrict the analysis to capital structures where the
entrepreneur raises exactly Dmin from debt ﬁnance and the remainder from issuing equity.
29raised through debt, the adverse selection effect will now only be a fraction
of p∆ = pS/pR. (Recall that there is no adverse selection effect associated
with equity since it is not mispriced.) We will now represent the adverse se-
lection effect as the maximum potential adverse selection effect, p∆ = pS/pR,
times the fraction of total funds raised by debt when incorporation costs

























where Kα ≡ K −(1−c)A. Hence, condition that has the RP entrepreneur











The RW-type entrepreneur will always invest in his project. If he ﬁ-


































Note that the inequality that describes the SP-type entrepreneur’s invest-
ment decision when investment is ﬁnanced with debt and equity, inequality
(A4), is “identical” to that when the investment is ﬁnanced by debt alone,
inequality (2), when Kα is replaced with K, R0 is replaced by R and p0
∆ is
replaced with p∆. Similarly, the inequality that describes the RW-type en-
trepreneur’s ﬁnancing decision when investment can be ﬁnanced with both
30debt and equity, inequality (A5), is “identical” to that when the investment
can only be ﬁnanced by debt, inequality (3). The characterization of the var-
ious equilibrium outcomes along the lines that the “adverse selection effect
dominates the investment effect,” i.e., p0
∆ > R0, and “the investment effect
dominates the adverse selection effect,” i.e., R0 > p0
∆, when the entrepreneur
can ﬁnance with debt and equity are (qualitatively) identical to the equi-
librium outcomes when the entrepreneur can only ﬁnance with debt. So
when p0
∆ > R0, the unique equilibrium is the underinvestment equilibrium;
when R0 > p0
∆ if in ﬁgure 1 R is replaced by R0, p∆ is replaced by p0
∆ and
K is replaced by Kα, then this amended ﬁgure also describes the equilib-
rium outcomes in a world where the entrepreneur uses debt and equity to
ﬁnance his investment project. Hence, introducing equity into the analysis
does not at all affect the insights and results obtained from the all debt ﬁ-
nance model. Because shareholders and bondholders have common beliefs
about default risk, equity is never mispriced in our model, but debt may be.
Consequently, reforms affecting the cost of incorporation may inﬂuence the
degree of adverse selection in the limited liability credit market and hence
the investment opportunities of ﬁrms, in a way precisely analogous to the
debt-only model of our main text.
31